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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ROGER BELANGER and JESSIE I 
JOCELYN, 
Plaintiff and Appellants, 
I 
vs. 
LESTER RICE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 8136 
BRIEF OF APPELL~T 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 1st day of May, 1952, the plaintiffs 
and the defendant signed a lease agreement, under the terms 
of which the plaintiffs leased to the defendant certain premises 
known as 67 West 7th South St., Salt Lake City, Utah, from 
the 17th day of March, 1952 to the 17th day of March, 1953, 
at a monthly re ntal of $75.00 per month, commencing with 
the 17th day of March, 1952. Exhibit "A," (T-50). 
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The leased premises consisted of a small restaurant with 
a counter and about 10 stools. The restaurant and leased prem-
ises was located at 67 West 7th South St., Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and was built in front of a residence up to the sidewalk, 
and the water was piped in from the residence part to the res-
taurant part (T. 18). 
The premises were originally leased from a William 
Y eiter and Jean Y eiter, . his wife, to the plaintiffs, and the 
plaintiffs subleased same to the defendant Rice. Defendant 
went into possession on March 17, 1952 and occupied 
said premises up to December 1, 1952, and then moved 
out (T. 18-19). He paid the rent up to December 1, 1952 
and delivered the keys to the premises to the plaintiff, Jessie 
Jocelyn, without any comments other than he was moving out 
(T. 23-37). 
Immediately thereafter the plaintiffs advertised the place 
for rent and on or about the 8th day of December they ob-
tained a renter for the premises in the person of a Mr. Jones 
(T. 20). Mr. Jones went into the premises on said day and 
remained there until December 28, 1952 (T. 22). At the time 
Mr. Jones took over, the defendant was then living in the 
premises back of the restaurant which he had rented from 
Mr. Yieter, the original Lessor with the plaintiffs. Shortly 
before Jones moved out the defendant, who had the control 
of the water leading to the restaurant shut off the hot water 
and without the hot water it was impossible to run the res-
taurant. The hot water, up to this time, was furnished by the 
owner of the premises, Mr. Yieter, to the plaintiffs, and the 
hot water was also provided by the defendant during the time 
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he occupied the premises and up until Mr. Jones moved in 
or shortly thereafter, and then was shut off by the defendant 
(T. 20-39). 
Plaintiffs then consulted with Mr. Yieter, the owner of 
the premises, and he refused to do anything about it (T. 22). 
Plaintiffs instituted suit in the Small Claims Court of Salt 
Lake City against the defendant Rice for the balance of the 
rent for December, 1952 and the defendant then settled with 
plaintiffs for this balance, together with costs of advertising 
the place for rent. The property then remained vacant for 
the remainder of the lease term, due to the fact that the plain-
tiffs could not relet the premises without hot water, nor could 
the plaintiff operate same themselves, which they intended 
to do (T. 21-22). 
On or about January 20, 1953 the plaintiffs commenced 
an action against the defendant Rice in the City Court of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, for the rent of said premises for the balance 
of the term of the lease, to-wit: January, February and to 
March 17, 1953, and recovered a judgment for the sum of 
$202.50, costs and attorney's fees in the sum of $75.00 
(T. 12-6). Subsequently to this an appeal was taken to the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, and a trial de-novo 
was had thereon. Pending the appeal and before the trial 
thereof the defendant filed an amended answer in which he 
sets forth certain facts not pertinent to the issues and which 
did not constitute a defense affirmatively as stated and alleged 
therein (T. 14}. There was no denial that the defendant va-
cated the premises on the 1st day of December, 1952, or 
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offered any excuse or defense for his surrendering the premises. 
If the court will review the testimony of the defendant and 
his witnesses as contained in the transcript, there is no asser-
tion or testimony of any kind going to any reason for abandon-
ing the premises, other than the fact that the wife of the 
defendant, who was operating the restaurant, was in ill health 
(T. 19) nor was there any testimony or contention on the 
part of the defendant that there was a mutual recission either 
by act or conduct on the part of the plaintiffs or any other 
defense or excuse for abandoning the premises. The court 
took the matter under advisement at the conclusion of the evi-
dence and later rendered its judgment of no cause of action 
against the plaintiffs (T. 15). Findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law was entered by the court, merely finding that the 
rent had been paid up to January 1, 1953 by the defendant. 
At the conclusion of the trial and pending the decision of 
the court the plaintiff moved the court for permission to file 
a supplemental complaint to contain facts which had transpired 
since the filing of the original complaint (T. 15) and without 
ruling on the motion or otherwise permitting the filing of 
said supplemental complaint rendered judgment, from which 
this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING UPON THE 
MOTION OF THE APPELLANTS FOR PERMISSION TO 
FILE THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT, OR PER-
MITTING SAID SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT TO BE 
FILED BY THE APPELLANTS. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF RENT OW-
ING BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE APPELLANT FOR 
THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
AFTER ABANDONMENT. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED UPON 
SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT TO APPRIZE THE APPEL-
LANTS UPON WHAT REASONING OR FACTS THE 
COURT RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION. 
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There is no pleadings in this case either by the original 
answer of the defendant or by his amended answer which 
constitutes a defense to the plaintiffs' cause of action, other 
than a general denial which put this case at issue. 
There is no evidence on the part of the defendant or his 
witnesses which in any manner constitutes a defense to the 
breach of the lease sued on herein. 
Appellant is unable to point out specifically to any testi-
mony on the part of the defendant or his witnesses in the 
transcript which would raise a defense on his part, either 
negatively or affirmatively and for that reason I am requesting 
the Court to review this testimony from the transcript of the 
evidence before the court in order t,::i' sustain the appellants' 
contention in this respect. 
Without having made any findings of fact or conclusions 
of law as to how the court, or why the court finds in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiffs of no cause of action, 
otherwise than the presumption that there was a mutual re-
cission of the lease and it is difficult for appellant to present 
any authorities to meet this situation other than present to 
the court the law governing an abandonment of a lease agree-
ment by a tenant. While there is no transcript of the court's 
remarks made at the conclusion of the trial, (other than argu-
ment by counsel) ( T. 40) the court did inquire of counsel 
to the effect, can a Lessor sue successively for each inonth' s 
rent as it becomes due, or did the bringing of the action in 
the small claims court by the appellant for the rent becoming 
due in January, 1952 against the defendant preclude the ap-
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pellant from further action thereon? The appellant presumes 
that such was the findings of the court, but the record is entirely 
silent as to this. 
For the purpose of sustaining the position of the appel-
lants, appellants submit the following law generally governing 
the rights of Lessors to recover from Lessees for an abandon-
ment of the lease and premises, which, in the opinion of the 
appellants governs the issues of this action. 
The respondent, without offering any defense or excuse 
for abandoning the leased premises, merely informed the appel-
lants that he was going to vacate the premises on the 1st 
day of December, 1952, because of the illness of his wife (T. 
19). He then turned over the keys to the premises to the 
appellants. 
McCoy vs. Celestin, 71 Pac. 2d 936. Calif. 
"It is the established law in this state, that when the 
lessee of premises vacates them without justification, 
the leaseor may take possession of the property for the 
benefit of the tenant and relet the same and thereafter 
maintain an action for the difference between the sum 
he has in good faith received from re-leasing the prem-
ises and the amount provided for to be paid by the 
terms of the lease. 
In the instant case there was substantial evidence to 
sustain the trial court's findings that defendant without 
justification vacated the premises leased by him from 
plaintiff and that plaintiff did not accept a surrender 
of the leased premises, but took possession of the same 
for the benefit of the defendant and released them for 
his account. 123 Pac. 797; 210 Pac. 430. 
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32 Am. Jr. 770. Par. 911. 
"The mere entering and taking possession of prem-
ises abandoned by a tenant, for the purpose of leasing 
them, is at best, an equivocal act not amounting to an 
election by the landlord between an acceptance of sur-
render terminating the lease and his right to relet for 
the purpose of mitigating the damages, for which the 
tenant is liable. 
Merely advertising the place for rent cannot be con-
sidered as constituting an acceptance of the tenant's 
surrender, and the fact that a landlord, upon receiving 
notice of his tenant's intention to vacate before the 
expiration of the term, enters upon the premises for 
the sole purpose of placarding them for rent does not 
terminate the contract. 
The institution of an action to recover rent for the 
period between the time the premises were abandoned 
by the tenant and the time when they were re-let estab-
lishes the fact that the landlord's taking possession was 
for the purpose of reletting the premises in order to 
mitigate damages, rather than for the purpose of ac-
cepting the surrender and terminating the lease. 
The foregoing authorities substantially sustains the posi-
tion and the acts and conduct of the appellants in their dealings 
with the defendant pursuant to the evidence as contained in 
the record of this case. 
If the court took the position that the bringing of the 
action by the appellants in the small claims court precluded 
them from bringing a further action on this matter, and I 
am assuming this, the following is the law on that point: 
Shea et al. v. Leonis et al, 84 Pac. 2d 277, Calif. 
"It is the settled law that where a lease is repudiated 
10 
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and the premises abandoned, the landlord has a choice 
of tw? remedies: He may rest upon his contract and 
sue hts tenant as each installment of the rent, or the 
whole thereof becomes dues; or, he may take possession 
of the premises and recover damages, which will be 
the difference between what he may be able to rent 
the premises for and the price agreed to be paid under 
the lease. 
32 Am. Jr. 433, Par. 527: 
"A contract to pay money in installments is divisible 
in its nature, and it is well established that each default 
in the payment of an installment, may be the subject 
of an independent action provided it is brought before 
the next installment becomes due. Accordingly, if under 
a lease of premises for. a definite term rent is payable 
periodically, the landlord can maintain an action for 
each installment as it becomes due, without in any 
way violating the rule forbidding the splitting of causes 
of action, and therefore without prejudicing his right 
to sue for future installments as they become due. In 
other words, recovery for rent for a subsequent period 
which is not a demand existing at the time of the com-
mencement of a suit for accrued rent, and cannot, 
under the conditions of the lease, be recovered at that 
time, is not barred by the recovery for the accrued rent. 
Separate actions may be brought on the lease for each 
installment, and a judgment for one installment of 
rent is not a bar to a second action to recover for a sub-
sequent installment.'' 
24 A.L.R. 891: 
"It is too well established to admit of controversy 
that rent is not due until it is earned, and that an actio~ 
cannot be maintained to recover rent before it is due 
11 
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by the terms of the lease. Hence the rule is universal 
that where the rent for a subsequent period was not 
a demand existing at the time of the commencement 
of a suit for accrued rent, and could not, under the 
conditions of the lease have been recovered at that 
time, the subsequent action is not barred by the former 
judgment.'' 
Appellant admits that at the time the action for the rent 
was commenced in the City Court of Salt Lake City, January 
20, 195 3, all of the rent for the unexpired term of this lease 
was not due, but at least the rent for January 1, 1953-, and the 
rent from January 17, 1953 to February 17, 1953, was due 
and an action could be maintained on this according to the 
foregoing citation, but before this matter was determined at 
the conclusion of this case before the District Court, the motion 
of appellants to file a supplemental complaint to include the 
rent then long past due before the trial of the case should 
have been granted in order to avoid a multiplicity of suits. 
The foregoing quotations is the law in California, Colo-
rado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Ver-
mont and Wyoming. 
32 Am. Jur. 777, Par. 915: 
"If the rent for the entire period between rent days 
is payable in advance, a surrender during the period 
does not operate to discharge the rent or any portion 
thereof for such period. The theory of this view is that 
rent payable in advance is considered as accruing on 
the day on which it is due." 
12 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING UPON THE 
MOTION OF THE APPELLANTS FOR PERMISSION TO 
FILE THEIR SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT, OR PER-
MITTING SAID SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT TO BE 
FILED BY THE APPELLANTS. 
As heretofore admitted by appellants, the entire rent for 
the unexpired term of the lease was not due when the original 
action was filed in the City Court. The rent from February 17th 
to March 17th, 195 3 was not earned, but at the time of the 
trail of this case the entire rent was long past due and in order 
to avoid a multiplicity of actions as the law states, this matter 
could have been determined in this action and for that reason 
a motion was. made to the court for permission to file this 
supplemental complaint. See supplemental complaint ( T. 15) . 
Under Rule 15 (d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure this 
motion should have been granted. 
(d) SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS: Upon motion 
of a party the court may upon reasonable notice and 
upon such terms as are just permit him to serve a sup-
plemental pleading setting forth transactions or occur-
rences or events which have happened since the date 
of the pleading sought to be supplemented. If the court 
deems it advisable that the adverse party plead thereto, 
it shall so order, specifying the time therefor. 
Appellants think it not necessary to go into this question 
further in view of the foregoing, and it is our opinion that the 
court abused its discretion in failing to rule on the motion 
or permit the appellants to file such a supplemental complaint. 
13 
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It, at no time, raised any new issue in t~e case, nor did the 
respondent raise the issue in his pleadings or in the trial of 
the cause of action. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS AND AGAINST 
THE RESPONDENT FOR THE AMOUNT OF RENT OW-
ING BY THE RESPONDENT TO THE APPELLANT FOR 
THE UNEXPIRED TERM OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT 
AFTER ABANDONMENT. 
For the reasons as set forth hereinabove in this brief under 
Points 1 and 2, appellants submits the arguments and the law 
made and provided governing this matter and points of error 
as raised by Point III, without further citations or arguments 
as we believe same is fully covered hereinabove. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT MAKING FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BASED UPON 
SUCH FINDINGS OF FACT TO APPRIZE THE APPEL-
LANTS UPON WHAT REASONING OR FACTS THE 
COURT RENDERED ITS JUDGMENT AGAINST THE 
APPELLANTS. 
The only argument appellants desire to submit to the 
court in support of the foregoing Point IV is to refer the court 
14 
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to the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the record of 
this case (T. 43-44) which are self-evident and explanatory. 
It is the contention of the appellants that such findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are virtually a nullity and do not comply 
with the following rule: 
Rule 52 (a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
EFFECT. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall, unless 
the same are waived find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct 
the entry of the appropriate judgment; and in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law which constitute the grounds of its action ... " 
Appellants respectfully submit that the judgment of the 
District Court in the foregoing matter should be reversed and 
judgment entered for the appellants herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE, 
Attorney for Appellants 
1"1 
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